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Close kin provide many important functions as adults age, affecting
health, financial well-being, and happiness. Those without kin report
higher rates of loneliness and experience elevated risks of chronic
illness and nursing facility placement. Historical racial differences and
recent shifts in core demographic rates suggest that white and black
older adults in the United States may have unequal availability of
close kin and that this gap in availability will widen in the coming
decades. Whereas prior work explores the changing composition
and size of the childless population or those without spouses, here
we consider the kinless population of older adults with no living
close family members and how this burden is changing for different
race and sex groups. Using demographic microsimulation and the
United States Census Bureau’s recent national projections of core
demographic rates by race, we examine two definitions of kinless-
ness: those without a partner or living children, and those without a
partner, children, siblings, or parents. Our results suggest dramatic
growth in the size of the kinless population as well as increasing
racial disparities in percentages kinless. These conclusions are driven
by declines in marriage and are robust to different assumptions
about the future trajectory of divorce rates or growth in nonmarital
partnerships. Our findings draw attention to the potential expansion
of older adult loneliness, which is increasingly considered a threat to
population health, and the unequal burden kinlessness may place on
black Americans.
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Older adults without kin are some of the most disadvantagedand isolated members of society (1, 2), because close kin are
vital sources of social support that affect social, economic, and
physical well-being (3, 4). The availability of kin is repeatedly
implicated in studies of healthy aging (5, 6), and lacking kin is
among the social factors most positively associated with nursing
facility placement and quality of care (7, 8). Loneliness appears
to be increasing among older adults (9) and is more strongly
associated with early mortality than smoking and excessive al-
cohol consumption (10). Because kin make up the dominant
share of most Americans’ close confidante networks (11), it is no
surprise that loneliness is most prevalent among the never
married, widowed, and divorced as well as the childless and those
without partners (12, 13). Of course, not all close kin are in
contact, geographically proximate, emotionally intimate, or will-
ing or able to exchange resources, but the availability of kin is a
necessary condition for their provision of such functions (14).
For these reasons, it is important to examine the population
dynamics of those who lack close kin (15). In the American
kinship system (16), demographic events determine the avail-
ability of kin, with marriage and fertility producing kin and death
and divorce reducing them. The clear links between demographic
processes and kinship networks (17, 18) imply that ongoing de-
mographic changes in American society will shift the availability
of living kin in the future. However, a continuing revolution in
relationship types in older adulthood, particularly the growth of
nonmarital partnerships (19, 20), complicates this picture. To
best understand changes in the future availability of kin, researchers
must consider potential continued increases in nonmarital
partnerships.
We draw on theories of cohort succession and demographic
metabolism (21) and the methods of computational demography
(22, 23) to examine the changing population of kinless individ-
uals in American society over the coming decades. Prior research
has examined the increasing percentages and numbers of people
who lack specific types of kin, such as the never married (24, 25)
or the childless (26, 27), but few studies have put these factors
together to consider the subpopulation that simultaneously lacks
multiple types of close kin and is at elevated risk of social iso-
lation, loneliness, and hardship (15, 28). The first and second
demographic transitions and the gender revolution suggest that
the share of people who lack multiple types of close kin is in-
creasing (29, 30). For instance, unions occur less frequently, with
delayed marriage and more nonmarriage (31), and historical
increases in union dissolution affect cohorts that have recently
aged into older adulthood (32, 33). Similarly, cohort childless-
ness doubled between 1980 and 2000 (34). Putting these factors
together, we can expect that more and more Americans will be
without close kin in the coming decades. On the other hand, if
nonmarital partnerships take on kin-like functions and continue
to grow in prevalence (20, 35), they may serve as a buffer against
such trends.
Two ongoing demographic changes may further amplify the size
of the US kinless population in the future. The first is the rise of
“gray divorce,” recent increases in the divorce rate among older
adults, which doubled among Americans over 50 y old between
1990 and 2010 (36). Risks of gray divorce are higher among blacks,
those with low education and incomes, and for second and
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subsequent marriages (36). The second set of demographic
changes leading to a potential growth in kinlessness is population
aging and population growth. In its most recent national projec-
tions, the United States Census Bureau estimates that the per-
centage of Americans age 50 and older will increase from 34.6% in
2015 to 41.5% in 2060 (37). In addition to comprising a larger
share of the US population, there will be many more older adults
in the future. As the overall population continues to increase,
demographers expect that the United States will have 61.8 million
more adults ages 50 and above in 2060 than it does today. Recent
work finds substantial increases in kinlessness among adults in their
50s and 60s for more recent birth cohorts, which combined with
population aging may yield dramatic increases in numbers kinless
in the coming decades (15).
The increasing prevalence of cohabitation and dating rela-
tionships may offset, to some degree, a potential rise in kin-
lessness among older adults. Increasingly, relationships formed
later in life do not result in marriage (38), and single older adults
are now just as likely to form cohabitating as marital unions (39).
In 2000, there were more than 1 million cohabiting older adults,
who together made up 1.5% of the population older than 50
(20). Other older adults may have a noncoresidential dating
partner (40); estimates suggest that 5% of older adults are in
such relationships (19). Dating relationships in older adulthood
can have a variety of meanings, with some functioning much like
marriage and others with less commitment (35). Whether recent
increases in these new relationship forms can offset increasing
kinlessness depends on how many of these adults also have
children and other types of close kin, because those with living
children are not kinless. At present, the vast majority (92%) of
cohabiting older adults have children (20), as do most (86%)
older adults in dating relationships (41). These facts explain why
recent work on contemporary kinlessness finds only marginal
differences in its population prevalence when nonmarital part-
nerships are included (15).
Although recent explorations find that white and black
Americans of both sexes currently have comparable rates of
kinlessness in older adulthood (15), the future burden of kin-
lessness is unlikely to be equally distributed across race and sex
groups, because of differential demographic rates and pop-
ulation aging. Recent research finds large racial differences in
the existence of kin of different types using survey data and that
these differences are growing in more recent birth cohorts (14).
For example, among those aged 45 to 54 in 2011, whites were
almost twice as likely to have living spouses as blacks (64% vs.
36%) but slightly less likely to have living children (73% vs.
78%). A portion of these complex patterns is determined by the
different ages at which whites and blacks experience kin mor-
tality (14, 42). For instance, by age 60, blacks are twice as likely
as whites to have lost a spouse (10.5% vs. 4.9%) and a child
(1.0% vs. 0.5%) (42). But, of course, differential fertility also
plays a critical role in producing these disparities by altering
numbers of children, how many siblings those children have, and
age differences between parents and children. There are also
differences in nonmarital partnerships by race, with cohabitation
and dating more common among blacks than whites (19, 20).
Another factor is that whites and blacks are expected to have
uneven patterns of population aging. The Census Bureau’s most
recent national projections forecast that the share of non-
Hispanic whites who are above 50 y old will grow from 41.2%
at present to 48.2% by 2060, while the share of non-Hispanic
blacks who are older than 50 will grow from 29.0 to 40.1% (37).
Other demographic factors also lead to differences in kin
availability between men and women. Women have greater life-
course overlap with children and grandchildren because of sex
differences in the age at childbearing, age differences between
spouses, and greater longevity (43). Women are also less likely to
marry and more likely to be widowed or divorced in older age
(25, 26). Cohabitation and dating in older adulthood are much
less common among women than men, with only 3% of women
over 50 cohabiting and 7% dating compared with 6% of men
over 50 cohabiting and 27% dating (19, 20). Social gerontologists
have examined the different family structures of older adults by
sex and what these differences imply for economic well-being,
health, and social integration (44, 45). However, it is unknown
how sex differences in kin availability will change due to fu-
ture trends in marriage, partnership, divorce, remarriage, fertility,
and mortality.
To understand the combined influence of these demographic
trends on kinlessness, we examine how the population of older
adults without close kin will change through 2060 and how kin-
lessness will vary by key population subgroups. We project the
size and characteristics of the US population using demographic
microsimulation methods that allow us to consider adults ages
50 and above with no living close family members (Approach,
Methods, Data, and Measures and SI Appendix). First, we in-
vestigate those without a living partner or biological children
(kinless 1). In the main text, we focus on partnership between
married couples as well as between unmarried parents; in SI
Appendix, we consider alternate definitions of partnership. Then,
because people without partners and children often leverage
sibling relationships for critical kin functions (46), we examine
those without a living partner, biological children, parents, or
siblings (kinless 2). We compare the largest native-born groups,
single-race non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black Ameri-
cans, and examine differences by sex. These groups constituted
84.0% of adults over 50 in the United States in 2014 and are
projected to comprise 63.3% of the older adult population in
2060 (37). To maintain simplicity and stay within the constraints
imposed by data availability, we do not examine other pop-
ulations, consider the role of international migration, or examine
intergroup marriage. As further justification for these choices,
we note that immigration flows to the United States are expected
to decline (47), that the stock of international migrants in the
United States is under 15% (48), and that the Census Bureau
projects that only 1.7% of the US population over 50 y old in
2060 will identify with two or more races (37).
Results
We project the US population by demographic microsimulation
parameterized with age–sex–race–specific demographic rates from
the historical record or the Census Bureau’s most recent national
projections. We review data sources in SI Appendix, Fig. S1. After
an initial period, the simulated populations produce data outputs
that match the macro trends in mortality, fertility, and nuptiality
that we use as inputs and that we find in historical and projected
estimates of core demographic rates (SI Appendix, Fig. S2). We
compare the simulated percentages kinless with empirical percent-
ages that can be estimated from recent nationally representative
surveys and find broad agreement (SI Appendix, Fig. S3). We
measure the percentages and numbers kinless among individuals
aged 50 and above, separately by race and sex. We obtain the
number of kinless individuals by multiplying the simulated per-
centages of individuals over 50 who are kinless by Census estimates
or projections of the number of adults ages 50 and above of that
race group in each year (37, 49, 50). To better understand what
demographic factors drive changes in kinlessness, we decompose
the percentage of the older adult population that ends up kinless
through different life-course pathways. Last, we consider kinlessness
in comparison with other population health burdens among older
adults: arthritis (51), diabetes (52), Alzheimer’s dementia (53), and
surgical loss of limbs [i.e., amputation (54)]. In SI Appendix, we
examine robustness to different future trajectories of divorce (SI
Appendix, Fig. S4) and partnership (SI Appendix, Fig. S5). We now
turn to our results.
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Percentages and Numbers Kinless by Race and Sex. Fig. 1 presents
our projections for 2015 to 2060 of the numbers (Fig. 1 A and C)
and percentages (Fig. 1 B and D) kinless within race and sex
groups. Fig. 1 A and B examines our first kinless measure (kinless
1), those without a living partner or biological children, and Fig.
1 C and D shows our second kinless measure (kinless 2), those
without a living partner, biological children, siblings, or parents.
Among whites, we project that the percentage without a partner
or biological children remains steady throughout the study pe-
riod, around 8 to 10% for both men and women. However, be-
cause of population aging and population growth, we project
increasing numbers kinless among whites, with the number of
kinless white men without a partner or biological children in-
creasing from 6.6 million in 2015 to 8.2 million in 2060, and the
number of white women without a partner or biological children
increasing from 6.3 million to 7.0 million. Blacks will experience
large increases in both the percentage and number kinless de-
fined as being without a partner or biological children from
2015 to 2060. Percentages for black men increase from 9.7 to
12.6% and for black women from 10.5 to 15.1%. The numbers
lacking a partner and biological children also increase for both
sexes among blacks: from 1.0 million kinless black men in 2015 to
more than 2.7 million in 2060, and from 1.1 million to 3.3 million
kinless black women over the same period. Summing our results
for whites and blacks, we project that there will be 21.1 million
individuals over 50 y old without a living partner or biological
children in these race groups in 2060.
Fig. 1 C and D focuses on our second measure of kinlessness,
older Americans without a partner, biological children, siblings,
or parents. Among both whites and blacks, the numbers and
percentages of those without any living close kin increase be-
tween 2015 and 2060. In 2015, 0.8% of white men and 1.1% of
white women were without living close kin, but these levels ap-
proximately double by 2060 for both sexes to 1.9% for white men
and 2.2% for white women. These increases in percentages
correspond to huge increases in the numbers of older whites
without close kin between 2015 and 2060: from 0.6 million to
1.6 million white men, and from 0.8 to 1.9 million white women.
Increases are even larger for blacks. Percentages with no living
close kin are already higher among blacks than whites in 2015
(1.7% among black men and 2.2% among black women). These
figures increase to 5.6% for black men and 7.3% for black
women by 2060. According to our projections, in 2060, there will
be 1.2 million black men and 1.6 million black women with no
living close kin. Together, we estimate that there will be 6.3 million
whites and blacks without a living partner, children, siblings, or
parents in 2060.
How Population Aging Contributes to Growth in Kinlessness. Next,
we examine how the population age structure will change from
2015 to 2060 and how the kinless subpopulations are distributed
among older adults. Fig. 2 shows population pyramids for whites
(Fig. 2A) and blacks (Fig. 2B) who are over the age of 50 in 2015,
2030, and 2060. A dashed black line helps to trace the aging of the
1961-to-1965 birth cohort over these periods. Those lacking a living
partner or children (kinless 1) are shown in gray and those lacking
all living close kin (kinless 2) are shown in black. It is apparent from
both sets of population pyramids that the over-50 population is
aging considerably, with greater numbers reaching older ages, es-
pecially among women. We also see that the kinless subpopulations,
under both definitions, become larger across all older age groups,
especially for blacks. Moreover, the kinless population is becoming
more widely distributed across different ages within the older adult
population, indicating that demographic metabolism and cohort
succession, rather than population aging, are driving changes in
the percentages kinless (population aging does drive increases in
numbers kinless). Whereas in 2015 the kinless population is largely
concentrated among those in their 50s and 60s, by 2060 kinlessness
is found across all older adult years. Age standardization techniques
indicate that population aging contributes only marginally to
changes in kinless prevalence (SI Appendix, Fig. S6).
What Accounts for the Increases in Kinlessness? Next, we consider
what demographic and social factors are driving the increases in
kinlessness documented above. Fig. 3 shows stacked percentages
of the 50+ population with no living partner or biological chil-
dren split into three categories. The bottom category, group A,
represents those who never married and never had children by
each year in the simulation. This group is responsible for the
majority of the increase in kinlessness among white men, black
men, and black women. The second group, Group B, represents
those who were previously married but never had children. These
individuals are kinless because they have not yet remarried, and
may never, after a spousal death or divorce. Such individuals
account for the vast majority of kinless white women, and they
also make up sizable but declining shares of kinless white men,
black men, and black women. The third group, group C, includes
the remaining causes of being without a partner or biological
children, such as those whose partner and children died. Group
C is small and there is little change in it over time, although we
note that it is larger for blacks than for whites, consistent with
mortality explaining a small but meaningful amount of racial
disparities in kinlessness (14, 42).
A
C
B
D
Fig. 1. Projected numbers kinless 1 (A), percent kinless 1 (B), numbers kinless 2
(C), and percent kinless 2 (D), people age 50 and older, by year, sex, and race.
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Fig. 2. Population pyramids of kinless non-Hispanic whites (A) and blacks
(B) among adults aged 50 and older from 2015 to 2060.
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We also examined the demographic and social factors leading
to increases in the population percentage of individuals without a
living partner, biological children, siblings, or parents for all race
and sex groups (kinless 2; SI Appendix, Fig. S7). In addition to
the dynamics underlying changes in the population without a
living partner and children discussed above, changes in this
measure may be affected by parental survivorship, sibling survi-
vorship, and historical increases in one-child families. We found
no evidence that parental death rates led to growth in this
measure; rather, parental death rates declined overall for each
race and sex group. Instead, the vast majority of the increase in
having no living kin is through sibling death. Although sibling
survivorship is increasing, sibling death plays such a prominent
role in these trends because sibling sets are changing in line with
historical fertility declines associated with the first demographic
transition. That is, older adults increasingly have fewer siblings
and are less likely to have a much younger sibling. Together,
those whose siblings died account for the vast majority of
changes in lacking all close kin for blacks (84% of the increase
for both black men and black women) and between half and
two-thirds among whites (67% for white men and 56% for white
women). A related contributor to the increase in lacking all close
kin is the historical rise of one-child families. We find that in-
creases in those who never had siblings account for a larger share
of the increase for whites (32% for white men, 43% for white
women) than for blacks (16% among black men and 15% among
black women). Examining race differences in lacking all close
kin highlights the complex ways that historical fertility patterns
interact with racial disparities in mortality (14, 42) to produce
kinlessness.
We also examined whether different trajectories of future divorce
rates account for increases in kinlessness (SI Appendix, Fig. S4). We
found that although the levels of kinlessness would increase slightly
if divorce rates were to double or quadruple, the overall trends as
well as the race and sex differences do not differ from the above
results. We then considered whether increases in nonmarital
partnerships that do not result in childbearing can be expected to
offset increases in kinlessness (SI Appendix, Fig. S5). These
analyses did not alter our primary conclusions. Even con-
servatively assuming that all dating and cohabiting relation-
ships among childless older adults are stable partnerships and
continue growing at current rates, we still see substantial growth
in the share and size of the kinless population, with approxi-
mately equivalent race and sex disparities.
Kinlessness as a Population Health Burden. To contextualize our re-
sults, we consider how our projected growth of the kinless pop-
ulation compares with projections of other important population
health burdens among the older American population (Table 1).
We wish to draw attention to two points. First, our projections in-
dicate that by 2060 the kinless population, defined as those without
a partner or living children, will be larger in size (21.1 million) than
the projected number of older adults suffering from diabetes
(16.9 million), Alzheimer’s dementia (13.8 million), or loss of limbs
(2.2 million) in 2050. It will also be larger than the size of the older
adult population suffering from arthritis in 2005 (20.6 million).
Relatedly, we expect that the kinless population defined as those
lacking all close kin in 2060 will be larger (6.3 million) than the
populations suffering diabetes in 2001 (4.6 million) or Alzheimer’s
dementia in 2010 (4.7 million). Second, we note that our projected
increases in kinlessness are of similar magnitude to several of these
chronic health burdens. Given that loneliness among older adults is
a growing population health threat, with meta-analyses finding a
50% increase in survival likelihoods for those with stronger social
relationships (10) and established associations between loneliness
and lacking living kin, we advocate that researchers must pay
greater attention to the kinless population. Likewise, because the
majority of care given to older adults comes from family members
(4), it is important to consider how individuals without family will
fare in the future.
Discussion
There is a renewed focus among demographers on the intersec-
tions between population processes and kinship, family, and social
network structures (55–57). Prior demographic research on kinship
has focused on coresidence, intergenerational transfers and ex-
changes, and the influence of different types of kin resources on
the life chances of descendants (58–60). By contrast, counting
those without kin and studying the implications of being kinless are
neglected undertakings because few population-based surveys ask
about noncoresidential kin. Compounding this problem, those
without kin are often disadvantaged, and they may be more likely
to be in institutionalized care and thereby omitted from the sam-
pling frame of many major surveys. Older adults have lived within
dense kin networks for most of human history and the kinless have
been a small subpopulation in the modern demographic era (61).
However, recent declines in marriage, increases in gray divorce,
and fertility decline are leading to larger numbers of older adults
with no close family members. Mortality improvements and the
increase in new relationship forms among older adults are not large
enough to offset these trends.
2.2 2 2.5
3.7
5.7
0
5
10
15
Pe
rc
en
t
2000 2015 2030 2045 2060
     White men
2 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.9
0
5
10
15
2000 2015 2030 2045 2060
     White women
2.2 2.7
3.5
5.9
8.8
0
5
10
15
Pe
rc
en
t
2000 2015 2030 2045 2060
     Black men
1.1 1 1.8
4.4
7.7
0
5
10
15
2000 2015 2030 2045 2060
     Black women
Group A Group B Group C
A
C
B
D
Fig. 3. Stacked percentages of White males (A), White females (B), Black
males (C ), and Black females (D) ages 50 and older without a living partner
or biological children, 2000–2060. Note: percentages in group A in key years
are presented as circles. Group A includes those who never married and
never had children; group B includes those who were previously married but
never had children; and group C includes the remaining cases, such as those
whose partners and children died.
Table 1. Projections of chronic health burdens on older adults in
the United States
Projections Start* End* Growth* Interval
Health burden
Arthritis 20.6 46.3 25.7 2005–2050
Diabetes 4.6 16.9 12.3 2001–2050
Alzheimer’s dementia 4.7 13.8 9.1 2010–2050
Surgical limb loss 0.7 2.2 1.5 2005–2050
Kinlessness
Kinless 1 14.9 21.1 6.2 2015–2060
Kinless 2 1.8 6.3 4.4 2015–2060
Note: Kinlessness projections are estimated for non-Hispanic white and
black Americans only. Sources are given in the text.
*Numbers are in millions.
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Our findings point to dramatic increases in the numbers of
kinless older adults in the United States, whether we consider a
broad or a narrow definition of kinlessness. The increases occur
for whites and blacks, men and women. By 2060, we expect the
population of white and black Americans over 50 y old without
a living partner or children to reach as high as 21.1 million,
6.3 million of whom will also lack living siblings or parents, up
from our estimates of 14.9 million and 1.8 million, respectively, in
2015. The population of adults who will be over 50 y old in 2060 is
already alive, which increases our confidence about probable
levels of future kinlessness, barring dramatic changes in projected
demographic processes.
Our results indicate that growth in numbers without a partner
or children is primarily driven by the increasing size of the aging
population overall. Although we also find increases in the pop-
ulation percentage that is kinless, this result was most evident
among the black population. We find differential growth by race
and sex in the share of adults over 50 who are kinless and im-
portant differences in the demographic forces driving kinlessness
across these groups. There are especially notable increases in
kinlessness among blacks, and slightly more for black women
than black men. These changes are driven by cohort succession,
where increasing numbers of black individuals who never married
and never had children are currently aging into older adulthood.
Among whites, increases in those without a partner or children are
driven by population aging, rather than increases in the population
percentage without these two types of close kin.
However, when considering increases in those with no living
close kin (partner, children, parents, or siblings), we find in-
creases in both the percentages and numbers kinless across race
and sex groups. The percentage with no close kin is projected to
double by 2060 for whites and more than triple for blacks. In-
creases in this measure are driven by large increases in having no
living kin through the death of one’s siblings, which accounts for
more than half of the growth of this type of kinlessness among
whites and the vast majority among blacks. This effect is the
product of both fertility and mortality forces: Historical fertility
declines mean that older adults in the coming decades will in-
creasingly have fewer siblings than previous generations. With
fewer siblings, each individual’s risk of all of their siblings having
died increases, potentially offsetting gains in older adult survi-
vorship, a feature compounded by decreasing age heterogeneity
in sibling sets. Blacks have much larger increases in lacking close
kin through the sibling death pathway than whites due to higher
mortality. The increasing prevalence of adults raised without
siblings in one-child families, which drives population growth
among those who never had siblings, is another demographic factor
increasing in importance over the projection period. This pathway
to kinlessness is more prominent for whites than for blacks.
Whether older adults are prepared or unprepared for being
without close kin may depend on their pathway to kinlessness.
Some pathways to kinlessness may be expected. For instance, those
who never marry and never have children know at younger ages
that they will not have a partner or children to care for them in
older adulthood. They may be able to plan accordingly, either
leveraging sibling ties, creating strong kin-like relationships with
nonkin, or by relying on institutions for care. Our findings show that
this group, those who never married or had children, are driving the
largest projected increases in the share of the older kinless pop-
ulation for white men, black men, and black women. These trends
are robust to substantial potential growth in new relationship forms.
Unexpected kinlessness is more difficult to plan for, and it can
come through one of two pathways. The first is the death of kin.
Demographers have recently embarked on explorations of this
topic and found that it may be an underappreciated dimension of
racial inequality (14, 42), but it needs more attention. However,
our findings show that a very small percentage of the future
population will be kinless because of the death of a partner and
children. We find that a second pathway through divorce or wid-
owhood among the childless is the more common entry to un-
expected kinlessness. This is the modal route to kinlessness among
white women and accounts for a substantial share of kinlessness
among other demographic groups as well. Because of large recent
increases in divorce at older ages (36), this issue deserves more at-
tention. Even those who lack a living partner or biological children
through expected means (e.g., the never married and childless) may
still end up experiencing unexpected kinlessness through sibling
death. We found that this pathway to unexpected kinlessness ac-
counts for a large percentage of the increasing share of the black
population without living close kin, but it is less relevant for whites,
which may point to even larger racial disparities in access to social
resources in the future. At the same time, if recent increases in white
middle-age mortality persist (62), our results may differ such that a
larger share of the future white population is kinless through death.
Conclusion
The impending increase of kinless older adults is a potentially
critical demographic trend for society as a whole, institutions
that provide services for older adults, and the kinless themselves.
We know that those who lack kin are more likely to be socially
isolated, suffer poorer health, and have fewer economic re-
sources. But, of course, not all individuals without kin fit into
these categories, and not all those with kin are able to draw on
them for social and economic support. A limitation of our focus
on the demographic processes driving kinlessness is that we did
not examine how geographic proximity, exchange, contact, and
emotional closeness might exacerbate or mitigate the effects of a
growing kinless population on loneliness and other social issues.
Many of those with kin may still be socially isolated, among other
factors, because of a lack of these relationship qualities. A related
limitation is that we do not focus on step-kin, who may provide an
important source of support for older adults (62); future work
could consider the role of such individuals. At the same time,
while the majority of informal care for older adults is provided by
family members (4), some who lack kin may be able to substitute
roles traditionally played by partners, children, siblings, or
parents with paid help or the camaraderie of friendship. In either
case, however, estimates and projections of kinlessness offer a
strong starting point to better understand these patterns. We ad-
vocate that such topics receive more attention in future work.
Approach, Methods, Data, and Measures
To conduct our simulations, we employed the freely available Berkeley Socsim
demographic microsimulation model (63–65), which we parameterized with
age–sex–state–specific probabilities of individuals experiencing demographic
events. We assemble these probabilities from several sources that contain
historical and projected, societal-level demographic rates as described in SI
Appendix. We provide code for interested researchers to run the Socsim
program, obtain our results, and replicate and extend these analyses (https://
osf.io/z3suy/?view_only=dac305f99c414e578aceb0eb3aadf5cd). We began
with populations of 50,000 white and black individuals drawn from the 1880
Census and simulated the evolution of these groups over time. We run one
large simulation for each race group under these parameters, consistent
with other microsimulation research (66, 67); at the end of the simulation
there are over 290,000 simulated individuals alive and above the age of 50,
which yields precise estimates. Microsimulation is the most popular method
of assessing how demographic processes affect kinship networks over long
periods (22, 68). Demographic microsimulation works by simulating the behav-
iors of a hypothetical population of individual agents over time, allowing them
to marry, divorce, remarry, have children, and die probabilistically at speci-
fied age–sex–state–specific rates, where states can be any category such as
parity, marital status, or ethnicity. We explicitly model nonmarital fertility
and nonmarital partnership defined as relationships between unmarried
parents of a child in the main text, with alternate definitions explored in
SI Appendix. We use “closed” microsimulation models, in which partnering
decisions are constrained by the available population, allowing us to trace
the long- and short-term evolution of kinship networks and define relevant
kin ties of interest (69).
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